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For example, suppose you are shopping
for a used car. You find a car that looks
fine but you cannot judge its mechanical
condition. A good car is worth $2,000,
but a lemon only $1,000. Unfortunately,
both types look the same to you; only the
owner knows the true quality. You
believe there is a 50 percent chance that
the car is high quality. How much should
you offer for it? If you offer $2,000, the
owner will accept your offer, but there is
a 50 percent chance that you purchased a
lemon and overpaid. Another plausible
strategy is to offer the average price,
which in this example would be $1,500.
In this case, the owner will reject your
offer if his car is worth $2,000, but he
will accept it if the car is a lemon. You
definitely overpaid this time by shelling
out $1,500 for a $1,000 car. In fact, you
will always overpay unless you offer
$1,000 and get the inferior car. In other
words, you will not be able to buy a
“good” used car in this market.
There are ways around this problem,
however. One response is a warranty. A
high-quality-car seller might offer a war-
ranty with the car. The high-quality car
is now worth more, say $2,100 in our
example, because the seller pays for
repairs. Since a good car is unlikely to
break down, the expected cost of this
warranty to the seller is low—say only
$100.  The poor-quality-car owner can
also sell his car for $2,100, but since it is
a junker, the expected warranty costs
may very well exceed $1,100. It is no
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Information problems pervade the
economy. This Commentary describes
the challenges they create and the
clever solutions markets find to
overcome them.
Thornton Wilder wrote that we live in
“a cloud of ignorance,” and that’s per-
haps especially true in the world of buy-
ing and selling. Economic transactions
usually involve people with unequal
access to information. A doctor knows
more about medicine than do her
patients. A used-car seller knows more
about the condition of his car than the
buyer. A company’s managers know
more about the value of their firm’s
assets than does their banker—or their
shareholders. These sorts of “informa-
tion imbalances” can have costly conse-
quences. When used-car buyers can’t
tell the difference between quality cars
and lemons, they may find it hard to pur-
chase a quality used car. In the financial
world, investors, unable to distinguish
between creditworthy businesses and
money-losing ventures, put their money
in T-bills, and business funding dries up.
Why information imbalances should
lead to such consequences was once
quite puzzling to economists. In theory,
the price of a good—be it a used car or
company stock—would adjust until the
demand for it equals the supply. A 
business looking for a bank loan should
always be able to find credit if it is 
willing to pay enough for it. Or, think-
ing about it from the perspective of the
bank, if a bank denies credit at a partic-
ular interest rate, it should be willing to
lend to the business at a higher rate.
That a business might be completely
shut out of the credit market does not
conform to the story told in introductory
economics classes. 
The struggle to understand why markets
behave this way has brought some key
insights, however, and in 2001 the Nobel
Prize honored George Akerlof, Michael
Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz for their
work on this problem. They show that
imperfect information—such as
unknown asset quality—is the culprit
behind the costly mistakes and misfunc-
tioning markets described above. Fur-
thermore, they showed that many puz-
zling features of actual markets can be
explained as responses to information
problems. Often, market participants
have found ways to mitigate information
problems by using additional prices or
other signals to help clear the market.
One price is enough to match the buyers
and sellers in the Econ 101 case, but
with information problems, it takes more
than just that.
Taking the used-car market, home insur-
ance, and bank lending as a backdrop,
this Commentary explains how informa-
tion deficiencies interfere with establish-
ing prices and describes how some well-
known features, such as warranties and
deductibles, help to get around these
problems.
n  Pricing Problems in the
Used-Car Market
More than 30 years ago, George Akerlof
wanted to understand the surprisingly
large price difference between new cars
in showrooms and those that have just
left the showroom. Most people at the
time explained this as the joy of owning
a “new” car. Akerlof thought there was
more to the story. He thought the prob-
lem was that buyers could not tell the
difference between high- and low-
quality used cars. In other words, they
did not know whether the car’s owner
was selling his car because he needed
cash or because he had found a hidden
problem too costly to fix. If buyers can’t
identify “lemons,” the uncertainty drives
down the price of all used cars and can
even mean that only bad cars get sold.longer worth passing the lemon off as a
good car: the warranty means he’ll most
likely pay more than the $1,100 profit in
repair bills. Better just to tell people it’s
a lemon and take the $1,000. With the
introduction of a warranty, both high-
and low-quality cars are simultaneously
able to sell in the marketplace.
n  Insurance Markets
Akerlof’s insight applies to other mar-
kets as well. Another market with infor-
mation problems is insurance. How can
a home insurer provide insurance if it
can’t differentiate between careful (safe)
and careless (risky) homeowners? It’s
really the lemons-market story all over
again. Charge a premium high enough
to cover the average risks, and only the
risky homeowners sign up. Charging an
average premium with only risky home-
owners means the insurance company
will lose money. So in the end, the only
solution is that the insurance company
charges a high premium and gets the
risky homeowners. The safe home-
owners fail to get insurance—even
though the company would like to
insure them! 
Once again, though, while a single price
will not clear the market, using another
approach can. Think about how home
insurance actually works. You pay a 
regular premium, and in the event of a
theft, you can get the stolen articles
replaced after paying a fixed deductible.
A careless homeowner is willing to pay
a high premium in return for a low
deductible because he’s most likely
going to leave the door unlocked and
end up paying this deductible. A careful
homeowner, however, would reduce her
premium in return for a high deductible
that she is unlikely to pay. 
The key point in getting this two-part
pricing to work (and why a single price
won’t) is making sure that each home-
owner likes his or her insurance deal 
better than the other’s. Even though the
careless homeowner can reduce his pre-
mium payment by switching to the other
insurance deal (lower premium, higher
deductible), once the theft occurs, he
will end up paying the higher deductible.
As he is more likely to leave the door
unlocked, the money he saves from a
lower premium is small compared with
the higher expected deductible payment.
So, he sticks with his original contract.
Likewise, the careful homeowner
wouldn’t want the high premium.
n  Commercial Loans
Joseph Stiglitz observed similar pricing
problems—and a similar solution—in
commercial bank lending. Firms borrow
from banks to finance themselves: to
build factories, pay workers, and ship
goods. Because the likelihood of default
varies from business to business, the
bank needs to learn about the firm’s risks
in order to set the correct interest rate.
Financial statements and annual reports
provide substantial information, but they
are still inadequate because they are
nothing more than a picture of the firm
taken at a particular point in time. Just by
looking at a picture of a person, can you
tell whether or not that person is a
smoker, follows a low-fat diet, or has a
gene that predisposes him to heart dis-
ease? No. Similarly, by looking at a
financial statement you cannot always
tell whether or not a firm is undertaking
risky investments that earn a high return
but also entail a high default risk. A risky
firm that expects to earn a high return
must also pay a higher rate on loans, just
as junk bonds pay a higher interest rate
than T-bills.
The problem is that the bank cannot tell
which firm is riskier just by looking at
the financial statements. If the bank
decides to offer an average interest
rate—like the average price in the 
used-car example—the loan may be too
expensive for a safe firm, which expects
to earn a lower return. Then, only the
high-risk firm accepts the offer, and the
bank loses money. But if the bank offers
a loan with a high interest rate so it does
not lose money, only the high-risk bor-
rower accepts the offer and many good,
safe projects go unfunded. In other
words, risky firms drive safe firms out 
of the loan market. 
Does the problem sound familiar? Once
again, as in the used-car market and the
insurance industry, a “lemons problem”
arises. As before, the source of the prob-
lem was that the price alone could not
separate good cars from bad, or safe
homeowners from risky ones. In the
lending case, the interest rate—the price
of the loan—cannot by itself separate the
low-risk borrowers from the high-risk
ones. What should the bank do?
n  Loan Commitments 
Just as the used-car market used war-
ranties and homeowner’s insurance used
deductibles, it shouldn’t be surprising
that the bank can solve the problem with
a loan contract that uses something
beyond price to screen borrowers. The
bank has a device that makes its loan
offer to one type of borrower unattrac-
tive to the other type, and thus lets both
get loans. 
Banks offer something called a loan
commitment: This guarantees future
funding at a preset rate. How should the
bank price this in a way that separates
risky borrowers from safer ones? Just as
in the home insurance case, while one
price won’t do, two prices—a regular
premium and a deductible—will. A loan
commitment has an up-front fee (called 
a “commitment fee”) that borrowers pay
when a credit line is established. Later, 
if the borrower decides to get a loan (or
“take it down”), it pays the agreed-upon
interest rate. The interest rate and com-
mitment fee are like the premium and
deductible for insurance. Just as low-
premium/high-deductible home insur-
ance is preferred by careful homeown-
ers, a line of credit with a low up-front
fee (premium) and a high interest rate
(deductible) is preferred by the safe firm.
The total cost of this credit line (fee plus
interest) is low enough for a safe firm to
want the loan, even though it is more
expensive than if the bank could identify
the safe firm. 
For the high-risk firm, the bank offers a
high upfront fee and a low interest rate,
similar to the high-premium/low-
deductible home insurance preferred by
careless homeowners. The safe firm
does not expect to use the line of credit
and therefore won’t pay a high up-front
fee; nevertheless, it wants guaranteed
access to funds in the event that the
credit market dries up. The risky firm,
however, does expect to use the line of
credit, so it is willing to pay a high up-
front fee. Each contract is tailored by the
bank to the insurance needs of a 
specific type of firm.
Because a loan commitment is a tailor-
made insurance contract, it must be 
purchased before the uncertainty about
the credit need is resolved. In other
words, after your house burns down, no
one will sell you home insurance to
cover your loss because it no longer
matters whether you were careful or not.Similarly, when a firm starts looking
for a loan in the spot market, a bank can
no longer distinguish between safe and
risky borrowers by using a fee and an
interest rate because, in the absence of
the funding uncertainty, both types will
go for the cheapest loan. If a credit line
is not prearranged, the pricing structure
is ineffective in separating borrowers.
Bank loan commitments may be less
familiar than warranties or deductibles,
but they are hardly less common. Well
over three-quarters of all commercial
loans in the United States are made
under loan commitments, and loans
made under commitment total over
$700 billion. 
n  Two-Part Pricing
Information problems show up in many
markets. These problems can make it
difficult to buy a used car, get insurance,
or take out a loan. The heart of informa-
tion problems is that a single price is not
enough to clear the market. One power-
ful solution adopted in many markets is
for firms to offer their customers several
alternatives, each designed to induce a
given type of customer to be truthful
about its risks. Two-part pricing, with 
a premium and a deductible, is one such
solution that shows up in areas as
diverse as insurance and loan commit-
ments. Such contractual solutions to
information problems are essential to
the operation of markets.
n  Recommended Readings
A good place to start for more informa-
tion on the work of Akerlof, Spence, and
Stiglitz is their Nobel lectures:
George Akerlof, “Behavioral Macro-
economics and Macroeconomic Behav-
ior,” American Economic Review, June
2002, pp. 411–433.
Michael Spence, “Signalling in Retro-
spect and the Informational Structure of
Markets,” American Economic Review,
June 2002, pp. 434–459.
Joseph Stiglitz, “Information and the
Change in the Paradigm in Economics,”
American Economic Review, June
2002, pp. 459–501.
The discussion of lemons, bank loans,
and loan commitments is based on:
George Akerlof, “The Market for
Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 84, 1970, pp.
488–500.
Arnoud Boot, Anjan V. Thakor, and
Greg F. Udell, “An Economic Rationale
for the Pricing Structure of Bank Loan
Commitments,” Journal of Banking
and Finance 11, 1987, pp. 271–289. 
Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss,
“Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information,” American 
Economic Review 71, 1981, pp.
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